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KEYNESIAN, NEW KEYNESIAN AND 
NEW CLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
By B. GREENWALD and J. E. STIGLITZ' 
1. Introduction 
FOR more than two centuries, there have been two opposing views of the 
capitalist economy. One stresses its virtues, and the efficiency with which 
prices carry information between consumers and producers, and allocate 
resources. The other spotlights the shortcomings of the market system, and 
particularly its episodes of massive unemployment of capital and labour. 
Adherents of the first group usually treat unemployment as a temporary 
aberration that market forces will cure if left to themselves. The New 
Classical Economists have gone further. They interpret changes in employ- 
ment levels as rational agents' responses to perceived changes in relative 
prices: workers in 1932, for example, took more leisure because relative 
wages looked low. They liken unemployed capital to a spare tyre-spare 
capacity held for those few times when it is really needed. To the critics of 
capitalism, such views are dangerous, unscientific nonsense, misleading 
governments into acquiescing in the grave social and private costs of high 
unemployment. Keynes reconciled these conflicting views of capitalism. He 
confronted the unemployment problem, and argued that limited govern- 
ment intervention could solve it. Once unemployment was removed, the 
classical vision of the efficient market could be restored. Samuelson dubbed 
this the Neoclassical Synthesis. 
The Neoclassical Synthesis was taken as an article of faith. Fundamental 
questions about the failures of the market system, such as the causes of 
periodic depressions and the unemployment that accompanied them, were 
avoided. Keynesian economics created schizophrenia in the way that 
economics was taught: macroeconomic courses, in which students were 
introduced to Adam Smith's invisible hand and the fundamental theorems 
of welfare economics, were followed by macroeconomic courses, focusing 
on the failures of the market economy and the role of government in 
correcting them. Two sub-disciplines developed. Microeconomists criticized 
macroeconomists for their lack of rigour and theoretical foundations. 
Macroeconomists castigated microeconomists for the unrealism and inap- 
propriateness of their theories. Dissatisfaction with Keynesian economics 
was also based on the want of explanation for some of its central 
assumptions, particularly concerning the sluggishness of prices and wages. 
Why did wages and prices not fall enough in recessions? Why didn't firms 
that wanted to sell more simply lower their prices? A quarter of a century of 
research failed to provide convincing answers to these questions. This state 
of affairs could not continue for long. 
1Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution is 
gratefully acknowledged. The authors wish to thank Peter Sinclair for comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
(? Oxford University Press 1987 
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There were two ways in which the two sub-disciplines could be recon- 
nected. Macrotheory could be adapted to microtheory; and the converse. 
New Classical Economics took the first approach. Its advocates aimed to 
derive the dynamic, aggregative behaviour of the economy from the basic 
principles of rational, maximizing firms and individuals. The School 
recognized the importance of dynamics for understanding macro-behaviour, 
and the central role of expectations in shaping those dynamics. It focused 
attention, then, on the consequences of rational expectation formation, and 
it is this aspect of their work which has given the School its alternative 
name, the Rational Expectations School.2 
The other approach seeks to adapt microtheory to macrotheory. For the 
want of a better term, one can refer to it as the New Keynesian Economics. 
The phenomena of unemployment, credit rationing and business cycles are 
inconsistent with standard macroeconomic theory. New Keynesian Econom- 
ics aims to develop a microtheory that can account for them. There are 
numerous different strands to New Keynesian Economics, taken in its 
broadest possible sense. One major element is the study of imperfect 
information and incomplete markets. 
This paper aims to present a broad outline of this aspect of the New 
Keynesian Economics, and to show how it resembles and differs from 
traditional Keynesian Economics. Keynes himself had a novel, and mark- 
edly non-neoclassical vision of how the economy worked. Keynes used 
picturesque language to describe the behaviour of entrepreneurs: they were 
moved by "animal spirits". But when Keynesian economics came to be 
codified, and presented in the form of a simple model (as in chapter 18 of 
the General Theory, and the expositions of others, such as Hicks (1937) and 
Klein (1948)), earlier modes of thinking crept back. We contend that this 
vision, captured so well in many of his brilliant passages, provides greater 
understanding of unemployment and business cycles than do the formal 
Keynesian models.3 
2. Some important Keynesian insights 
Four of Keynes' many insights we regard as essential to the explanation of 
unemployment and business fluctuations. These are: 
2The leading proponents of the New Classical Economics, Barro, Lucas, Sargent and 
Wallace, have consistently based their models upon rational expectations. But their central 
doctrines derive not from rational expectations per se, but from the old classical assumption 
that markets always clear. It is this last assumption that leads directly to the conclusions that 
(involuntary) unemployment cannot exist, and that macro stabilization policy may well be 
ineffective. Neary and Stiglitz (1983) have shown that with rational expectations and price 
rigidities, government policy is even more effective than under myopic expectations: multipliers 
are even larger; and Buiter (1981) and Taylor (1985) provide numerous other examples where 
rational expectations do not imply policy impotence. 
3 Leijonhufvud (1968) expresses a not dissimilar view, although in terms of his distinction 
between Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes, we would wish to classify 
chapter 18 of the General Theory as an early example of the former. 
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1. A general theory must account for the persistence of unemployment 
2. A general theory must account for the fluctuations in unemployment 
3. Savings and investment must be carefully distinguished 
4. Disturbances in demand, not supply, underlie the cyclical behaviour of 
macroeconomic aggregates. 
2.1. The persistence of unemployment 
Keynes attributed the persistence of unemployment to the failure of 
wages to adjust with sufficient speed to clear labour markets, while at the 
same time stressing, in chapter 19 of the General Theory, that greater 
flexibility in money wage rates need not exert stabilizing effects. An 
assumption that money wage rates are frozen is integral to the Fixed Price 
School, exemplified, among others, by Barro and Grossman (1971). But this 
premise fails to square with evidence (money wage rates fell by one third in 
the Great Slump in the United States), and cries out for theoretical 
justification. In fact, Keynesian conclusions do not require absolute rigidity 
in money wage rates. All that is needed is that wages fail to fall to market 
clearing levels. As we shall see below, efficiency wage models offer a 
compelling set of explanations for the critical Keynesian contention that 
wage rates fail to clear the markets for labour. 
2.2. The fluctuations in unemployment 
Turning to the second issue, the fluctuations in unemployment, we face 
two questions. What is the source of shocks which cause them? Why do 
changes in prices fail to dampen their effects? The shocks that generate 
macroeconomic fluctuations are rarely, if ever, wholly exogenous to the 
economic system. Evidence suggests that they often take the form of 
changes in the demand for investment, and in particular for inventories. Yet 
if production functions are concave, and recessions are characterized by 
relatively low real wage and/or interest rates, intertemporal production 
smoothing should occur. Inventories should serve to limit fluctuations, not 
exacerbate them. Keynes rightly stressed the role of investment in macro- 
economic fluctuations. But he attributed the changes in investment to 
animal spirits, to unexplained changes in expectations. His story is less than 
complete. 
To account for fluctuations in unemployment, Keynes invoked changes in 
the demand for investment; but he also had to say why prices, and in 
particular interest rates, failed to change by enough to offset them. In the 
General Theory, he argued that nominal interest rates would fall little if 
money demand were highly interest-elastic. One difficulty here is that it is 
real, not nominal, interest rates that should matter for investment; real rates 
take account of the rate of price inflation. In fact, the slump of the 1930s 
saw prices fall, and real interest rates rose somewhat. There must also be 
doubts (vented by Keynes himself, if with greater emphasis in the Treatise 
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on Money than in the General Theory) about how much extra investment a 
given fall in interest rates could secure (and when). 
The New Keynesian Economics offers a somewhat different account of 
the determination of investment, and in particular for the likely failure of 
interest rates to clear credit markets. These will be examined below. It also 
provides firm foundations for the tendency for swings in macroeconomic 
activity to become self-amplifying. But it has yet to furnish a complete 
explanation for the business cycle. It shows how shocks can induce 
protracted, major changes in investment and employment, but it treats such 
shocks as exogenous, not endogenous, phenomena. 
2.3. Savings and investment 
Keynes' third important insight that merits stress at this point is his 
distinction between savings and investment: 
"Those who think (that an act of individual saving leads to a parallel act of 
investment) ... are deceived.... They are fallaciously supposing that there is a 
nexus which unites decisions to abstain from present consumption with decisions 
to provide for future consumption; whereas the motives which determine the latter 
are not linked in any simple way with the motives which determine the former" 
(General Theory, p. 21) 
One aspect of this distinction is the difference between funds within the 
firm, and funds at the disposal of households. If capital markets were 
perfect, this difference would carry no particular implications for the 
spending of households and firms. In his Treatise on Money, Keynes had 
written at length about what he called the Fringe of Unsatisfied Borrowers, 
and the wider economic significance of credit rationing (chapter 37, section 
(iii)(b), and elsewhere). These powerful ideas are almost eclipsed in the 
General Theory, although a definite echo can be found on p. 158. One can 
rationalize Keynes' claim that it is current income that exercises the 
dominant influence upon consumers' spending two ways: either current 
income may be taken as a good forecast of (unobservable) future income, or 
else capital market imperfections may be adduced to explain it. It is the 
latter view, pursued by Flemming (1973) among others, upon which the 
New Keynesian Economics lays most stress. 
2.4. Supply and demand 
Keynes needed, as we said, to find a source of fluctuations in economic 
activity. It was apparent that changes in technology, in supply, could not 
account for what was occurring in the Great Depression. He therefore 
naturally turned to changes in demand. Those brought up in the Marshallian 
tradition were schooled in analysing demand and supply disturbances 
separately. 
Keynes' reliance on the Marshallian demand/supply framework posed 
problems which he, and his followers, never satisfactorily resolved. For the 
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Marshallian theory suggested that equilibrium ought to be at the intersec- 
tion of demand and supply; if firms were on their supply curves, real 
product wages should rise as employment falls. This was one of the first 
empirical propositions of Keynesian economics to fall by the way-side. But 
just as Marxian economics was never abandoned by its proponents, simply 
because its predictions turned out to be wrong, so too Keynesian economics 
was not to be abandoned simply because one of its empirical predictions was 
unconfirmed. There are three ways of dealing with uncomfortable facts: (a) 
to deny them, e.g. by asserting that wages and prices are measured 
incorrectly (just as the New Classical economists approach the unemploy- 
ment problem by denying the relevance of the unemployment statistics); (b) 
to provide a new interpretation, e.g. by asserting what is relevant is not the 
spot wage, because of the existence of long term (implicit) contracts, 
ignoring the fact that real product wages of newly hired workers or workers 
on spot contracts also did not rise significantly; (c) to assert that the 
empirical proposition was not central to the theory. Thus, a large literature 
developed, asserting that firms, while solving quite complicated intertemp- 
oral maximization problems, acted as if the price and quantities they faced 
were fixed. It was simply asserted that firms did not use price policy to affect 
sales, an implausible and counterfactual assumption.4 
3. The New Keynesian Economics 
The New Keynesian Economics begins with Keynes' basic insights. But it 
recognizes the need for a more radical departure from the neoclassical 
framework, and for a much deeper study of the consequences of imperfec- 
tions in capital markets, imperfections which can be explained by the costs 
of information. The major ingredients of this new perspective are: 
1. Efficiency wage theories 
2. Capital market imperfections 
3. Credit rationing 
4. A revised view of the role of monetary policy 
We examine each in turn. 
3.1. Efficiency wage models 
Efficiency wage models' are based on the hypothesis that there is 
imperfect information about the characteristics of workers; that the actions 
4 Models which postulate imperfectly competitive firms explain why real wages may not equal 
the value of the marginal product; but they have little to say about involuntary unemployment 
(indeed, in contrast to models with classical unemployment, with real wages in excess of the 
value of the marginal product, here real wages are less than the value of the marginal product; 
whether employment is higher or lower in equilibrium simply depends on the (uncompensated) 
labour supply elasticities) or about its fluctuations. Below, we provide an explanation for cyclical 
variability in mark-ups. See also Stiglitz (1984). 
5 For surveys of efficiency wage theories, see Stiglitz (1986a, 1986b). 
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of individual workers cannot be adequately monitored; and that it is not 
possible to write contracts that ensure that the worker bears all the 
consequences of his actions. 
As a result, the quality of the labour force, its productivity (and hence the 
firm's profits) may increase with the wage paid. Similarly, labour turnover 
may decrease with an increase in the wage, and since the firm must bear 
some part of the turnover costs, again profits may increase with an increase 
in wages, up to some point. In the face of unemployment, wages may not 
fall, for firms will recognize that if they lower wages, productivity will 
decrease, turnover may increase, and profits will fall. In this perspective, 
firms are competitive; there are many firms in the market; but nonetheless 
firms are wage setters, at least within a range. If the Walrasian wage, where 
the demand for labour equals the supply, is too low, any firm has the option 
of raising its wage and thus increasing its profits. The efficiency wage, the 
wage that maximizes the firm's profits, may of course vary with economic 
circumstances; hence the wage is not absolutely rigid. But wages need not 
fall to market clearing levels.6 
It can be objected that the presence of wage rigidities in some sector(s) of 
the economy is not sufficient to explain unemployment.7 So long as there is 
some sector with flexible wages, any individual who chooses not to work 
there is voluntarily unemployed. We view this to be largely a semantic 
objection: the fact is that individuals who are observationally indistinguish- 
able from the unemployed individual are being employed at higher wages; 
that the market equilibrium is inefficient; and that resources which could be 
productively employed remain idle.8 
Efficiency wage theories explain why wages may fail to clear labour 
markets. Analogous models for capital markets can explain why interest 
rates may fail to achieve equality between the demand and supply of credit 
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, 1983, 1985). More generally, Akerlof and Yellen 
(1985) have pointed out that even when firms should change the wages they 
pay they may not do so; they show that the loss of profits from this 
6Thus, the policy implications of these theories may be markedly different from those of the 
standard fixed wage-price models. The latter assume that economic policy has no effect on the 
wages paid. The efficiency wage models recognize that certain policies (e.g. unemployment 
compensation) may have strong effects on equilibrium wages, and the consequences of this 
need to be taken into account. 
7This is, of course, not the only objection to efficiency wage theory. For a more extended 
discussion, see Stiglitz (1986b). 
8Elsewhere (Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986b)) we have discussed a variety of reasons why it 
may be rational for an individual to reject a low wage now, if he believes that a better paying 
job will become available in the near future. These have to do with asymmetric information, 
with the information conveyed by the individual's willingness to accept a low wage job as well 
as with the fact that once someone is unemployed, he becomes "used labour" with adverse 
effects on future wages similar to those that arise in Akerlof's (1970) lemons model (see 
Greenwald (1986)). We have also discussed why a worker might wish to decline an employer's 
offer of a low wage now, coupled with a higher wage in future if the firm survives, because to 
accept it would, in effect, make the worker take an equity position in the firm (Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1987)). 
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near-rational behaviour may be small, even though the loss to society may 
be large. Indeed, if firms are risk averse (as we argue below they will be), 
and if there is some uncertainty about the consequences of wage changes, 
keeping wages unchanged in the face of certain disturbances is fully- 
rational. Again, similar arguments hold for the capital market. 
Moreover, the efficiency wage models further show why the wages of 
firms are interdependent: the optimal wage for any one firm depends on the 
wages paid by all other firms. This interdependence may lead to multiple 
equilibria, in which no firm changes its wage even in the face of changes in 
its demand.9 Thus, by explaining wage, interest rate, and price rigidities, 
these theories help to explain why certain disturbances are amplified as a 
result of the repercussions they induce within the economic system, rather 
than dampened. 
There is a further set of reasons for the "multiplication" of disturbances. 
In the presence of incomplete markets and imperfect information, the 
actions of one firm or individual exerts externality-like effects on others; the 
reduction of production by one firm, in response to increased uncertainty or 
a reduction in its working capital, increases the uncertainty and reduces the 
working capital of other firms. While price adjustments tend to dampen 
disturbances, externality effects may (and in these instances do) exacerbate 
them. 
3.2. Capital market imperfections 
Capital market imperfections derive from imperfect information. There 
are asymmetries of information between managers of firms and potential 
investors, asymmetries which can give rise to what one can call "equity 
rationing." Equity rationing matters because it means that if firms wish to 
obtain more capital, to invest or to increase production, they must borrow 
the funds; and even if they are able to do so, they must expose themselves 
to considerable risk, including the risk of bankruptcy (the risk of not being 
able to pay back the promised amounts). 
The consequences of this are exacerbated by the absence of futures 
markets. Thus, firms cannot sell the goods which they plan to produce until 
after they have produced them. Every production decision is a risk decision, 
a risk which they (the managers and equity holders) must bear, and which 
they cannot easily shift on to others. The absence of futures markets implies 
that firms cannot sell their output at the time of production. 
Thus, an analysis of firm behavior must focus on its willingness to 
undertake these risks. Unexpected changes in its working capital base 
(caused for instance by unexpected changes in the prices at which it can sell 
its existing stock of goods) could, for instance, have a deleterious effect on 
its willingness to produce. 
9 Again similar arguments hold for the capital market and the product market. 
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3.3 Credit rationing 
While at times considerations of potential risk limit the amount that 
firms are willing to produce, at other times, firms' access to capital is 
limited; there is credit rationing. The reasons that suppliers of capital do not 
raise interest rates in the presence of an excess demand for capital are 
analogous to the reasons that firms do not lower wages in the presence of an 
excess supply of labour: increasing interest rates may lower the expected 
return to the supplier of capital, either because of selection effects (the mix 
of applicants changes adversely) or because of incentive effects (borrowers 
are induced to undertake riskier actions.) 
3.4. A revised view of the role for monetary policy 
Monetary policy exerts its influence-when it does-not so much through 
the willingness of individuals to hold cash balances, but through the 
availability of credit. Asymmetries of information imply that if banks decide 
to lend less, there are not other potential lenders who are perfect 
substitutes. Banks' decisions to lend are analogous to those determining 
firms' willingness to produce. The monetary authorities can take actions 
which affect banks' willingness to lend (or the terms under which they are 
willing to lend.) Though, depending on the economic circumstances, other 
lenders may take partially offsetting actions, their actions can never be fully 
offsetting. 
3.5. A new general theory 
The New Keynesian Economics provides a general theory of the 
economy, derived from micro-economic principles (and thus integrates the 
two sub-disciplines.) It succeeds both in filling the lacunae in traditional 
Keynesian theory (e.g. by explaining partial wage rigidities, rather than 
simply assuming rigid wages) and resolving the paradoxes and inconsis- 
tencies of more traditional Keynesian. theory (both the internal inconsis- 
tencies, e.g. concerning how expectations are formed, and the inconsis- 
tencies between its predictions and observations.) It provides an explanation 
both for an equilibrium level of unemployment (through the efficiency wage 
theories) and for business fluctuations.'0 The theory of business fluctuations 
it provides is simple: in broad outline, certain shocks to the economy affect 
the stock of working capital of firms. Even if firms had perfect access to the 
credit markets (that is, they could borrow as much as they wished, at the 
actuarially fair interest rate), the amount they would be willing to borrow is 
limited by their willingness to bear risk; the fixed commitments associated 
10 This is not to say that there are not important gaps in the theory which remain. The theory 
developed so far does not provide an entirely endogenous business cyle; it only explains how 
the economy responds to certain shocks. 
There remains a controversy over whether an entirely endogenous business cycle theory is 
required, or whether one should be content with a theory which translates certain kinds of 
shocks into disturbances in which the economy persists below "full employment" for a number 
of periods. We do not take a position on that issue here. 
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with loan contracts implies that, as the working capital which is available is 
reduced, the risk (bankruptcy probability) associated with any level of 
borrowing increases. Thus, if their working capital is reduced, their desired 
production level (given that they do not have fixed commitments to sell 
their products") is lowered; and it takes time to restore working capital to 
normal levels. The theory explains not only why both aggregate shocks (like 
an unexpected decrease in the price level, resulting from a monetary shock) 
and sectoral shocks (like an unexpected shift in demand, or the unexpected 
formation of an oil cartel) would exert aggregative effects: willingness to 
produce will, in general, be a concave function of working capital, and 
hence a redistribution of working capital will have aggregative effects.12 
In the discussion below, we shall show how this theory provides an 
explanation for several of the phenomena which seemed so hard for more 
traditional Keynesian theory to explain: (a) it explains why firms do not 
lower prices in recessions, i.e. it explains cyclical movements in mark-ups; 
(b) it provides an explanation of cyclical behaviour of investment and 
inventories; (c) it provides an explanation for why unemployed workers do 
not succeed in getting hired by offering to work for lower wages, and even 
in industries where efficiency wage considerations are not important, it 
provides a partial explanation for why workers do not offer to work for 
lower wages, in return for the promise of higher wages in the future; and (d) 
it provides an explanation for why an unanticipated wage-price reduction 
might actually serve to exacerbate the recession, rather than alleviate it (by 
further deteriorating the working capital base of firms). 
4. Some shortcomings in Keynes, and the new Keynesian resolution 
It is a matter for regret that Keynes' summary of his arguments in chapter 
18 of the General Theory, and the formal modelling of Keynes' thinking by 
many later writers, relied so much upon the neoclassical and Marshallian 
tools which then, as now, were the style of the day.13 A much richer picture 
emerges from the General Theory taken as a whole. Yet this picture is 
11 Even if they have commitments, potential purchasers may not honour those commitments, 
particularly in the event of their bankruptcy. In recessions, the risk associated with any 
"commitment" is increased. 
12 These redistribution effects seem to be at least as important as others sometimes 
postulated with government debt policy (the change in the maturity structure of the debt 
having either an intertemporal or an intratemporal redistribution effect) or with some forms of 
insurance. 
The redistribution resulting from insurance associated with implicit labour contracts, a 
redistribution from the corporate to the household sector, operates essentially through the 
mechanism described above. In the presence of perfect capital markets, the only effects arising 
from that redistribution would be those associated with differing marginal propensities to 
consume between capitalists and workers. 
13 Quite possibly the reason for this was that, to win acceptance for the new ideas, Keynes 
and his expositors wished to demonstrate that only a few changes in the basic assumptions that 
underlay much conventional thinking about the economy, could lead to dramatically different 
results. 
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defective in certain respects, particularly in its treatment of the firm and the 
role of money, and, underlying these, its analysis of capital markets. 
4.1. Equities and bonds 
One weakness was Keynes' aggregation of long term bonds and equities 
(as may be seen, for example, in footnote 1 on p. 151 of the General 
Theory). Even in the absence of bankruptcies, these two sets of assets differ 
in their risk properties. Recessions raise bond values; equities fall. This 
makes them highly imperfect substitutes from the investor's standpoint. Still 
more important are the differences in the nature of the firm's commitment: 
with bonds and loans, the firm is committed to paying back a certain 
amount on a particular date; with equities, no such commitment exists. As a 
result, for firms as well as investors, there two securities are far from perfect 
substitutes. Particularly in recessionary periods, firms seldom resort to the 
equity market to raise needed capital: investors suspect that any firm 
wishing to do so is in bad straits, unable to obtain capital from banks or 
other sources. Elsewhere, we (Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss (1984)) have 
provided a simple adverse selection model in which only the worst firms will 
in fact resort to the equity market to raise capital. 
4.2. Supply and demand again 
Keynes' attempt to explain economic fluctuations in terms of demand 
considerations alone not only posed the quandary we have referred to 
before-why don't firms use price policy to increase their sales-but posed 
another problem: how could a small open economy ever face Keynesian 
unemployment problems? Simply by changing its exchange rate, it could 
face unlimited demand for its products. 
In our theory, there is not a clean distinction between demand and 
supply. Firms would be willing to produce more, if they could have an 
assured demand. In this sense, demand is limiting production. Firms are not 
willing to produce more, given the risks associated with production in the 
absence of an assured demand. In this sense, firms are on their supply 
curve. Our theory thus explains why the amount of goods firms are willing 
to supply, at any expected real product wage, may change over the business 
cycle. 
Our theory can also explain why firms, in setting their prices, might 
attempt to have a higher mark-up over costs in recessionary periods. In 
markets with imperfect competition and imperfect information, firms must 
recruit customers. They do so partially by using price policies. They thus 
face a trade-off, lower prices today leading to higher future sales, higher 
future profits, but lower current profits. The price they choose depends on 
the implicit cost of capital (not the market rate of interest), and in the 
presence of equity rationing, this may be higher in recessionary periods. 
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4.3. Investment 
Keynes argued that the primary determinant of the level of investment, 
for a given set of expectations, was the interest rate. Though there has 
always been some ambiguity about whether this is the real or nominal 
interest rate, the only sense that one can make of this is that it must have 
been the real interest rate. But real market interest rates have fluctuated 
relatively little (until the 1980s). A good theory should never take a 
constant (or an almost constant) as an explanatory variable. 
In our theory, credit availability at certain times is the major determinant 
of the level of investment. It is precisely at those times that monetary policy 
can affect the level of economic activity. In recessionary periods, however, 
banks may be willing to lend to any "good" prospect at the going interest 
rate, but there is a shortage of willing borrowers. In such circumstances, 
monetary policy is likely to be ineffective. 
The Keynesian-neoclassical theory simply cannot explain inventory fluc- 
tuations, the fact that inventories serve to exacerbate rather than to dampen 
fluctuations. Our theory can. Again, the increase in the effective cost of 
capital-the result of equity rationing and the decrease in the supply of 
working capital-implies that firms will wish to decrease their inventories in 
recessionary periods. 
4.4. The monetary mechanism 
The mechanism by which the monetary authorities affected the level of 
economic activity in Keynesian analysis is implausible. There are three 
steps: (a) the government takes actions which affect the money supply; (b) 
given individuals' demand functions for money (a function presumably of 
interest rates and income), interest rates change; (c) as a result of interest 
rate changes, investment changes.14 
There are problems with each of the steps: while the government may be 
able to affect the supply of outside money, there are close, near money 
substitutes, at least for transactions purposes. Moreover, money is not 
required for most transactions, only credit. (This is what makes those 
models which are based on the cash-in-advance constraint so implausible.) 
And to the extent that money is required for transactions purposes, one 
must explain why that is so. Moreover, the relationship between transac- 
tions and income is tenuous: many, perhaps most, transactions are 
exchanges of assets, and the kinds of economic changes associated with the 
14This is obviously an oversimplification. In some variants of the theory, the demand for 
money depends only on income, and hence, given rigid prices, a decrease in the supply of 
money must be accompanied by a decrease in income. No plausible mechanisms by which this 
is effected have been put forward. 
In other theories, the demand for investment is a function of expected future incomes, which 
in turn are a function of current income. The fluctuations in investment then become as much a 
consequence as a cause of income fluctuations. It-is hard to reconcile such naive accelerator 
models with rational behaviour. 
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business cycle are often accompanied by changes in wealth, and hence in 
asset distribution. 
To the extent that money demand is based on asset considerations, what 
is relevant, of course, is not income, but wealth. And since there are short 
term bonds which are, except for transactions purposes, perfect substitutes 
for money, the relevant opportunity cost of holding money is the short term 
money rate of interest; but if any interest rate is relevant for investment, it 
should be the real rate of interest.15 Moreover, as the recent development of 
Cash Management Accounts makes clear, it is clearly feasible to provide 
interest bearing "money," in which case the only relevant question facing 
the individual is the maturity structure of the debt which he wishes to hold. 
More recent Keynesians (e.g. Tobin (1969)) have proposed another 
mechanism by which monetary policy affects economic activity: In the 
general portfolio approach, different assets (short term, long term bonds) 
are seen as imperfect substitutes, and changes in the relative supply affect 
different interest rates, and, in particular, the price of equities. This can be 
criticized on several grounds. First, firms do not, for the most part, resort 
to the equities market to raise capital. Thus the price of equities is not 
directly relevant. How can we explain the observed correlations? In our 
theory, optimistic expectations, say about future sales, will be reflected in a 
high price of equities (high future profits), and in managers' willingness to 
produce. There is a correlation, but not causation. 
To put it another way, what managers and controlling stockholders are 
concerned about is not the price of equities today, but the price of equities 
when they go to sell their shares. The current price may be a good forecast 
of future prices, but businessmen are more likely to base their judgments 
concerning particular investment projects not on the judgments of some 
relatively uninformed outsider, but on their more well informed insider 
views. 
Secondly, in theory, changes in the maturity structure of the 
government's debt should have no effect on the market equilibrium, 
provided that there are not significant redistributive consequences of that 
change (and these seem implausible.) For those changes represent changes 
in the (stochastic) future tax liabilities of individuals. Individuals, in 
deciding on their optimal portfolios, should take into account other aspects 
of the risks which they face, including wage and tax risks; and if they do this 
correctly, there will be no effects on real interest rates. The Tobin approach 
would, in a perfect capital market, seem to rely on irrational behavior. 
Actually, we are sympathetic with the Tobin portfolio approach, because 
15 It is not clear whether it should be the long term or short term real interest rate. When the 
question is, when should a project be undertaken, the short term real interest rate is 
presumably relevant; when the question is, should a project be undertaken, it is presumably 
the long term real interest rate. Since the information relevant to undertaking a project (the set 
of suppliers, the prices at which factors can be purchased, etc.) becomes obsolete so rapidly, in 
many cases at least the question posed by firms is more the latter than the former. 
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these results on the Irrelevance of Public Financial Policy depend critically 
on the existence of a perfect capital market, an assumption which we have 
previously called into question. But the mechanism by which investment is 
affected is not through the change in interest rates or the price of equities, 
but through the availability of credit. 
5. Concluding remarks 
5.1. On methodology 
Capitalist economies are complicated. A model is supposed to capture its 
central features, not reproduce it exactly. Decisions of individuals and firms 
today are based on future expectations, and are affected by past decisions. 
Individuals do not have perfect foresight or rational expectations concerning 
the future. The events which they confront often appear to be unique, and 
there is no way that they can form a statistical model predicting the 
probability distribution of outcomes. And there is little evidence that they 
even attempt to do so. At the same time, individuals are not myopic. They 
do not simply assume that the future is like the present. 
Markets are not perfect. But markets do exist. Prices do adjust. Wages 
fall in the presence of massive unemployment. These "facts" pose some 
important strategic decisions for the modeller: within the foreseeable future, 
it is not possible to construct a dynamic model adequately reflecting all of 
them. Polar cases are easier to study. Should one assume perfect wage or 
price flexibility or no wage or price flexibility? Rational expectations or 
myopia? Any set of choices is open to criticism, but equally, can be 
defended as part of a long term research strategy. 
In our view, the choices must be dictated by the phenomenon to be 
studied. If this is unemployment, to begin the analysis by assuming market 
clearing is to assume away what is to be explained. Important as it is to 
understand the dynamic maximization problems individual and firms are 
engaged in, ignoring the important constraints they face (e.g. on the accesss 
to capital markets) results in models which are of little relevance. We 
suspect that in many instances, myopic models focusing on the constraints 
are far better than "rational" models ignoring them. Indeed, in some cases, 
one can show that the rational models with constraints look identical to the 
standard myopic models (e.g. with rule driven behaviour, all of profits and 
none of wages saved.) 
5.2. On policy 
There has been a long standing controversy over what governments 
should do in the face of unemployment: (a) nothing; (b) encourage wage 
reductions; (c) use monetary policy; or (d) increase government expendi- 
tures. The success of Keynesian theory has much to do with the fact that it 
provided a theoretical justification for those who wished to take the fourth 
course. The success of the New Classical theory has much to do with the 
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fact that it has provided a theoretical justification for those who wished the 
government to do nothing. 
In our view, Keynes' policy conclusions were basically correct. Govern- 
ment policy can affect the outcome; in recessionary periods, monetary 
policy is likely to be of limited efficacy; and wage cuts may not be 
effective.16 
5.3. On the efficiency of the market economy 
Though a half-century of experience may make us less sanguine about the 
government's ability to eliminate business fluctuations, a half-century of 
experience with alternative forms of economic organization have made us 
even less sanguine about the ability of these alternatives to provide the basis 
of a more efficient system of resource allocation. Like the emperor's new 
clothes, we may not be able to see the invisible hand because it is not there; 
or perhaps more accurately, because it is so invisible, we do not see how 
palsied it is. Unemployment is but the worst manifestation of pervasive 
market failures which arise in the presence of imperfect information and 
incomplete markets. But if the invisible hand of the market is palsied, the 
visible hand of the government may be far worse. Leibniz17 and J. B. 
Cabell's optimism18 was wrong: we do not live in the best of all possible 
worlds. We live in an imperfect world. And we must learn to live with those 
imperfections. Might not limited government intervention-correcting the 
worst manifestations of market failures, including massive unemployment- 
after all be the wisest policy to follow? In the end, Keynes, and Keynesian 
policies, are vindicated. 
Bell Communications Research, Morristown, N.J. 
Princeton University, and 
The Hoover Institution, Stanford University 
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